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Abstract. Advances in data storage, data collection and inference techniques have enabled the cre-
ation of huge databases of personal information. Dissemination of information from such databases
- even if formally anonymised, creates a serious threat to individual privacy through statistical dis-
closure. One of the key methods developed to limit statistical disclosure risk is k-anonymity. Several
methods have been proposed to enforce k-anonymity notably Samarati’s algorithm and Sweeney’s
Dataﬂy, which both adhere to full domain generalisation. Such methods require a trade off between
computing time and information loss. This paper describes an improved greedy heuristic for enforc-
ing k-anonymity with full domain generalisation. The improved greedy algorithm was compared
with the original methods. Metrics like information loss, computing time and level of generalisation
were deployed for comparison. Results show that the improved greedy algorithm maintains a better
balance between computing time and information loss.
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1 Introduction
In the modern era, the concern for privacy dates back to 1948 and the UN Declaration of hu-
man rights article 12 [1]. The exponential increase in the collection of personal information
has for some time represented a serious threat to privacy as it was conceived in that dec-
laration [2]. With the advancement of technologies for data storage, data mining, machine
learning, social networking and cloud computing, the problem has further increased. As a
counterbalance to these socio-technical transformations, most nations have developed both
general policies on preserving privacy [1] and speciﬁc legislation to control access to, and
use of, data (for example the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA)
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[3] of USA, Personal Health Information Protection Act (PHIPA) [4] in Canada, etc).
With improved data analysis tools, researchers can make use of the information from mul-
tiple sources improving both the efﬁciency and the scope of their research. However, with
the concomitant increased information ﬂows, the threats to individual privacy are also in-
creasing. One area of concern is the identiﬁcation of individuals within anonymised data
through the use of linkage attacks.
To reduce the risk of such attacks, the techniques of statistical disclosure control are em-
ployed. One such approach called k-anonymity [5, 6, 7, 8, 9] works by reducing data across
a set of key variables to a set of classes. In a k-anonymised dataset, each record is indistin-
guishable from at least k-1 others, meaning that an attacker cannot link the data records
to population units with certainty thus reducing the probability of disclosure. However,
preserving privacy through statistical disclosure control also reduces the utility of the data.
A good privacy preserving technique should ensure a balance of utility and privacy, giv-
ing good performance and level of uncertainty [10]. The system described in this article
maintains a balance between computing time and information loss (a standard conceptu-
alisation of the reduction of utility). Computing time is the time taken by a method to
convert a given dataset into k-anonymised form. Anonymising a dataset results in loss of
information; Xiao and Tao [11] proposed a metric called information loss (iloss) to calculate
the amount of information loss during generalisation. Three metrics, namely iloss, com-
puting time and level of generalisation are used to compare the proposed algorithm with
the existing ones.
In the remainder of this paper, section 2 gives preliminaries; section 3 describes the related
work. We review the algorithms that give full domain generalisation with record suppres-
sion. We observe that there is a trade off between anonymisation achieved and computing
time. Section 4 describes the details of the proposed improved greedy approach. Section 5
describes experiments conducted on two benchmark datasets. Section 6 gives the conclu-
sions.
2 Preliminaries
This section deﬁnes the various terms used in the paper. The complexity of the problem is
also described.
2.1 Deﬁnitions
2.1.1 Quasi-Identiﬁer
A quasi-identiﬁer set (QIS) is a set of attributes that can be linked to external information
to re-identify individual records. A QIS when combined with corresponding external data
can lead to the correct association of a data record with a population unit (also known as
identiﬁcation disclosure). Whether an attribute is a QI or not depends on a variety of factors,
the most important is the availability of external data with a variable that corresponds to
the potential QI.
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2.1.2 k-anonymity
A relation, T, is comprised of QIs and non-QIs. The QIs need to be anonymised as they
can be used to re-identify individual records. Let t be a tuple, then, the value of ith tuple
can be represented as ti[C].
T satisﬁes k-anonymity if for every tuple ti0 2 T, there exist k-1 other tuples ti1, ti2, ...
ti(k 1) 2 T. such that ti0[C] = ti1[C] = ... = ti(k 1)[C], 8 C  QIS
2.1.3 Generalisation
A set of values of a particular attribute is called a domain. Given two domains S0 and S1, the
expression S0  S1 means that values of attributes in S1 are more generalised than those in
S0. Generalisation T1 is k-minimal if it satisﬁes k-anonymity and there does not exist another
generalisation satisfying these conditions less general than T1. There are several schools of
thought about how generalisation ontologies should be generated and represented (see
[12] for a discussion). Figures 1 and 2 show examples for two value generalisation hierar-
chies.
Figure 1: Domain generalisation hierarchy for residence.
S0={ROU, SAM, CTC, PUR}
S1={TOWN}
Figure 2: Value generalisation hierarchy for work ﬂow.
Private_emp
Gov_emp
Unemployed
Self−emp−not−inc
Private
Self−emp−inc
Federal−gov
Without−pay
Local−gov
Never−worked
State−gov
xxx
2.2 Problem Complexity
A combination of the values of a set of QIs can be viewed as a hierarchical lattice. The k-
anonymisation algorithms need to search the solution space i.e. the full domain generalisa-
tion lattice to ﬁnd the k-minimal solution. In this section, we investigate how the size of the
lattice (i.e. the number of nodes in the lattice) depends on the number of quasi-identiﬁers
(r) and the height of generalisation of each QI.
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Proposition 1. Let QIS = fA1, ..., Arg be the set of quasi-identiﬁers for a private table, with
the corresponding domain generalised hierarchy DGH = fDGHA1, ..., DGHArg and let H
= fh1, ..., hrg be the corresponding height of domain generalised hierarchy such that hi =
height(DGHAi), for all 1  i  r. Then the size of the full domain generalised hierarchy,
DGH<A1;:::;Ar> is given by:
jDGH<A1;:::;Ar>j =
r Y
1
(hi + 1) (1)
Proof. The problem of ﬁnding the number of nodes at level n of the lattice of full domain
generalisation is same as the problem of ﬁnding the number of solutions to the equation:
x1 + x2 + ::: + xr = n (2)
subject to the condition
0  x1  h1;0  x2  h2;:::;0  xr  hr (3)
So, the number of nodes at level n is equal to the coefﬁcient of xn in
(x0 + x1 + ::: + xh1)  (x0 + x1 + ::: + xh2)  :::  (x0 + x1 + ::: + xhr) (4)
This is because the number of ways in which sum of r integers in (2) subject to the condi-
tions(3)equalsnissameasthenumberoftimesxn appearsin(4). Also, height(DGH<A1;:::;Ar>)
= h1 + h2 + ... + hr = hmax, since the maximum value attained by n in (1) is hmax, according
to the condition (3).
Let
(x0+x1+:::+xh1)(x0+x1+:::+xh2):::(x0+x1+:::+xhr) = C0x0+C1x1+:::+Chmaxxhmax
(5)
where, C0, C1, ... , Chmax is the number of nodes in the level 0,1, ... ,hmax of the lattice
respectively. We are interested to ﬁnd the total number of nodes in the lattice which will be
C0 + C1 + ... +Chmax. So, if in equation (5) we let x=1 then:
C0 + C1 + ::: + Chmax = (h1 + 1)  (h2 + 1)  :::  (hr + 1) =
r Y
1
(hi + 1) (6)
From Proposition 1 it can be shown that the size of full domain generalised hierarchy is
exponentially related to the number of QIs of a database.
Proposition 2. Let f(h;r) denote the number of nodes in DGH<A1;:::;Ar>, where QIS =
fA1, ..., Arg are quasi-identiﬁers for a private table T. Then f(h;r) = O((h+1)r) where h is
the average height of the domain generalised hierarchy of quasi-identiﬁers in QIS.
Proof. Let h = fh1;:::;hrg be the corresponding height of domain generalised hierarchies,
DGH = DGHA1, ..., DGHAr and let havg be the average height of the domain generalised
hierarchies, DGH.Thatmeans, havg = h1+h2+:::+hr
r . ThenumberofnodesinDGH<A1;:::;Ar>
is given by,
f(h;r) = (h1 + 1)  (h2 + 1)  :::  (hr + 1)[From Proposition 1] (7)
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and
(
r p
(h1 + 1)  (h2 + 1)  :::  (hr + 1)) 
(h1 + 1) + (h2 + 1) + ::: + (hr + 1))
r
(8)
[ From The AM-GM Inequality rule]1
f(h;r)  (
(h1 + 1) + (h2 + 1) + ::: + (hr + 1)
r
)r (9)
 (havg + 1)r (10)
= O((havg + 1)r) (11)
Thus, Proposition 2 shows that the solution space is exponential with respect to r (the
number of QIs). Given this, as r becomes large, it becomes impractical to exhaustively
search the lattice for a k-minimal solution. Thus, the lattice should be searched heuristically
in a manner that optimizes the trade-off between computing time and information loss.
Samarati’s algorithm used binary search to choose levels of the lattice to be searched. In
the next few paragraphs, we show that even if binary search is used, Samarati’s algorithm
is exponential in r. Dataﬂy is polynomial of ﬁrst order in r, but results in high information
loss. Our proposed algorithm is polynomial of second order in r and maintains the best
trade-off between computing time and information loss.
If we assume that QIS contains only the attributes having the domain generalised hierar-
chy of height, h, then, from expression (4), the number of nodes at level n of the full domain
generalised hierarchy (FDGH) is the coefﬁcient of xn in the expansion of (x0 + x1 + ... + xh)r
since, h1 = h2 = ... = hr = havg = h. The expansion of the above expression is given by,
(x0 + x1 + ::: + xh)r =
rh X
n=0

r
n

h+1
xn (12)

r
n

h+1
denotes the number of integer compositions of the non-negative integer n with
r parts x1;:::;xr each from the set f0;1;:::;hg and allows the representation,

r
n

h+1
=
X
r0+:::+rh=r
0:r0+1:r1+:::+h:rh=n

r
r0;r1;:::;rh

(13)
where

r
r0;r1;:::;rh

isamultinomialcoefﬁcient, deﬁnedas r!
r0!r1!:::rh! , fornon-negative
integers r0;:::;rh. We can verify the representation (13) by noting that for real numbers
y0;:::;yh , it holds that [13]
(y0 + y1 + ::: + yh)r =
X
r0;:::;rh0
r0+:::+rh=r

r
r0;r1;:::;rh

y
r0
0 :::y
rh
h (14)
1The AM-GM Inequality rule states that: the arithmetic mean of a list of non-negative real numbers is greater
than or equal to the geometric mean of the same list.
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Then setting yi = xi for all 0  i  h,
(x0 + x1 + ::: + xh)r =
X
r0;:::;rh0
r0+:::+rh=r

r
r0;r1;:::;rh

x0:r0 + :::xh:rh (15)
And comparing coefﬁcients of the right-hand sides of (12) and (15), we get (13). Now we
prove that central coefﬁcient

r
bhr
2 c

h+1
is the largest from the remaining coefﬁcient in
the expansion of (x0 + x1 + ::: + xh)r. This means that the number of nodes in the middle
level of the FDGH is highest among all levels.
Lemma 1. Let r  0 and h  0 be integers. For all integers n such that 0  n  hr,

r
n

h+1


r
bhr
2 c

h+1
(16)
The Proof can be found in [14].
Now we investigate the lower and upper bounds of the central coefﬁcient.
Lemma 2. In the expansion of expression (x0 + x1 + ::: + xh)r, the central coefﬁcient 
r
bhr
2 c

h+1
satisﬁes
(h + 1)r
hr + 1


r
bhr
2 c

h+1
 (h + 1)r (17)
Proof. The sum of all coefﬁcients in the expansion of the expression is (h + 1)r, which can
be obtained by setting h1 = h2 = ::: = hr = h in Proposition 1. The central coefﬁcient is
the largest amongst all coefﬁcients, which is shown in Lemma 1. Since the total number of
terms in the expansion of the expression is (hr + 1), we get the lower bound of
(h+1)
r
hr+1 and
the upper bound of (h + 1)r. Thus,
(h+1)
r
hr+1 

r
bhr
2 c

h+1
 (h + 1)r
Recently, Eger [15] has found a sharper approximation of the central binomial coefﬁcient
by generalising the famous Stirling’s approximation to the central binomial coefﬁcient. In
the following lemma, we write ak  bk as a short-hand for limk!1
ak
bk = 1.
Lemma 3. For all ﬁxed h,

r
bhr
2 c

h+1

(h + 1)r
q
2r
(h+1)2 1
12
(18)
The Proof can be found in [15].
3 Related Work
Several algorithms have been developed with the purpose of making de-identiﬁed data
k-anonymous [16, 17, 18, 19]. However, this paper is only concerned with the methods
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that aim to achieve k-anonymity through full domain global recoding, hierarchical gener-
alisation and minimal suppression. Two of the most popular approaches that meet this
speciﬁcation are Sweeney’s Dataﬂy algorithm [20] and Samarati’s algorithm [21].
Samarati proposed the concept of the domain generalisation hierarchy. The algorithm is
based on the axiom that if a node at level h, in domain generalisation hierarchy satisﬁes
k-anonymity, then all the levels of height greater than h also satisfy k-anonymity. To exploit
this, the algorithm uses a binary search over the levels of the domain generalisation hierar-
chy, i.e. for a DGH of height h, the search starts at a level of h/2 and if that level satisﬁes
the k-anonymity then it searches at the level h/4. Otherwise, it searches at the level 3h/4
and it goes on the same way till it ﬁnds the solution in the lowest possible level. This ap-
proach assumes that the optimal level is the one with the least generalisation and, within
that level, it takes the node that has the minimum information loss as the solution.
Dataﬂy uses a greedy algorithm to search the domain generalisation hierarchy; at every
step, it chooses the locally optimal move. One drawback with Dataﬂy’s approach in com-
mon with all such hill climbing type algorithms is that it may become trapped in a local
optimum [25].
Other methods, such as Incognito [22], aim to ﬁnd all possible solutions. However, a
major drawback of such approaches is that the number of solutions they return is usually
very high, and checking the information loss of all of them in order to ﬁnd the optimal
one is impractical. Incognito implements a dynamic programming approach with the idea
that if a subset of quasi-identiﬁers of a relation T is not k-anonymous then T cannot be
k-anonymous. The approach constructs a generalisation lattice of each individual subset of
QIS and traverses them by performing a bottom-up, breadth-ﬁrst search. The number of
generalisation lattices constructed for a QIS of order r is 2r i.e. the power set of QIS. Thus
the Incognito algorithm is at least of order 2r i.e. 
(2r) because at least one check is made
for k-anonymity for each generalisation lattice.
Emam et al. [23] proposed an algorithm called Optimal Lattice Anonymization (OLA) and
showed that it outperforms Incognito. It uses predictive tagging to prune the search space
of the lattice. However, if the globally optimal k-anonymous lattice lies on or above the
middle level of full domain generalized hierarchy, then the algorithm checks all the middle
level lattices for k-anonymity. We have shown above in Proposition 2 that checking only
the middle level of full domain generalized hierarchy is exponential in number of quasi-
identiﬁers.
Kohlmayer et al. [24] proposed the Flash algorithm for ﬁnding efﬁcient, stable and opti-
mal k-anonymity. They implemented their algorithm in a framework, which holds all the
data in a main memory (using dictionary compression). The maximum number of quasi-
identiﬁers for the datasets considered by them is 9. If the number of quasi-identiﬁers were
very high, then it would be difﬁcult to hold all the data items in the main memory.
4 The Improved Greedy Heuristic
Sweeney’s Dataﬂy starts checking from the lowest level of the DGH and checks for the k-
anonymity. If it is not satisﬁed then it generalises the most differentiated attribute, stepping
into the next level of hierarchy and repeating until it is satisﬁed that k-anonymity has been
achieved. It checks only one attribute in each level, which guarantees that a solution will
be found in polynomial time; but not necessarily the optimal one.
Analyzing the algorithms, we observe that both Samarati’s and the Incognito algorithms
give theoretically optimal solutions but not in polynomial time, whereas the Dataﬂy algo-
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rithm ﬁnds a solution in a polynomial time but is not necessarily optimal.
Figure 3: A visualization of the three processing strategies: the circles with ﬁllings repre-
sent Samarati’s method; the arrow represents the strategy for Dataﬂy and the dark circles
represent the improved greedy method.
The greedy heuristic that Dataﬂy uses simply generalises the most differentiated attribute.
This paper proposes an improved greedy heuristic which gives better solutions than the
heuristics of the Dataﬂy algorithm. The algorithm starts by checking for k-anonymity from
the lowest level. If it is not satisﬁed, the k-anonymity is checked by generalising one at-
tribute at a time simultaneously implementing the minimum suppression. If, by general-
ising an attribute, the k-anonymity is satisﬁed, the attribute is generalised and declared as
the solution to the ﬁrst phase. If after generalising all the attributes, none of them satis-
ﬁes k-anonymity, the case that is the closest to k-anonymity is selected to be generalised.
In case of ties the most differentiated attribute is selected. This process continues until a
solution is found. In Figure 3, the circles with ﬁllings represent Samarati’s method, the ar-
row represents the strategy for Dataﬂy and the dark circles represent the improved greedy
method.
Theorem 1. The number of nodes in the full domain generalised hierarchy that need to be checked
for k-anonymity in Samarati’s algorithm is exponential in the number of quasi-identiﬁers.
Proof. Samarati’s algorithm uses binary search on the levels of the lattice with the nodes in
the middle level being searched ﬁrst. For simplicity we assume h1 = h2 = ::: = hr = h,
then the number of nodes in the middle level of the lattice is given by the central coefﬁcient 
r
bhr
2 c

h+1
, where QIS = fA1;:::;Arg is the set of quasi-identiﬁers and H = fh1;:::;hrg
is the corresponding height of domain generalised hierarchy. In Lemma 2 and Lemma 3
we have shown that the central coefﬁcient is exponential in r. Thus, searching only middle
level of the lattice has lower bound
(h+1)
r
(hr+1) and the upper bound (h + 1)r.
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Therefore, as the value r becomes large, applying binary search on the levels of the lattice
becomes increasingly less effective in reducing the number of potential nodes that need to
be checked for k-anonymity.
4.1 Description of the Algorithm
Initially, a full domain generalisation hierarchy (FDGH) is constructed (using Samarati’s
algorithm). The algorithm then starts by checking for k-anonymity in the lowest level of
the FDGH which has only one node i.e. the node which has all the quasi-identiﬁers without
any generalisation. If k-anonymity is satisﬁed, then the dataset is k-anonymous as it is and
needs no further anonymisation. But if k-anonymity is not satisﬁed, then k-anonymity is
checked by generalising one attribute at a time. If none of the nodes at a given level of the
FDGHs satisﬁes k-anonymity, then the node that is closest to k-anonymity is selected (in
case of tie, the node which has generalized the most differentiated attributes is selected)
and k-anonymity is again checked by generalizing one attribute at a time in the selected
node. The previous step is repeated until a node is found which is k-anonymous. Theorem
2 shows that the complexity of the proposed algorithm is polynomial.
Theorem 2. The number of nodes in the full domain generalised hierarchy that need to be checked
for k-anonymity in the proposed greedy algorithm is polynomial of second order in the number of
quasi-identiﬁersandDataﬂyalgorithmispolynomialofﬁrstorderinthenumberofquasi-identiﬁers.
Proof. Let QIS = fA1;:::;Arg be the set quasi-identiﬁers and h = fh1;:::;hrg be the corre-
sponding height of domain generalised hierarchy. The proposed algorithm starts checking
nodes from the lowest level, 0 of the full domain generalised hierarchy, DGH<A1;:::;Ar>.
In the worst case (at level hi), r possible generalisations are checked for k-anonymity from
which the generalisation closest to k-anonymity is selected. This worst case value is ob-
tained by generalising the attributes from QIS one at a time from the selected node closest
to k-anonymity at level hi 1. Thus in the worst case, the algorithm goes to the highest
level, hmax of the hierarchy, DGH<A1;:::;Ar> and the number of nodes searched in our pro-
posed algorithm is given by O(r  hmax). In Proposition 1, we indicated that the highest
level, hmax is given by hmax = h1 + h2 + ::: + hr. In Proposition 2, we indicated that
havg = h1+h2+:::+hr
r . The number of nodes searched is given by O(r2 havg). If we assume
h1 = h2 = ::: = hr = h, it becomes O(r2  h). Thus the proposed algorithm is polynomial
of second order in the number of quasi-identiﬁers.
The Dataﬂy algorithm checks only one generalisation at level hi of the DGH<A1;:::;Ar>.
In the worst case, the algorithm goes to the highest level, hmax. So, the number of nodes
searched by Dataﬂy algorithm is given by, O(hmax) = O(rhavg). If we assume h1 = h2 =
::: = hr = h, it becomes O(r  h) which means the algorithm is polynomial of ﬁrst order in
the number of quasi-identiﬁers.
The details of the proposed algorithm are given in Algorithm 1.
5 Empirical Results
The three algorithms were tested on two datasets obtained from UCI Machine Learning
Repository: the Adult dataset [26] and the CUPS dataset [27]. The Adult dataset has 32,561
records and 15 attributes of which 8 attributes (namely Age (3), Profession (2), Education
(2), Marital status (2), Position (2), Race (1), Sex (1), Country (3)) were considered to be
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Algorithm 1: Improved Greedy
Notations: n: number of quasi-identiﬁers
k: desired anonymity
m: suppression limit
node: array of n integers
array node: array of nodes
array anonymity: array of integers
array index: array of integers
dtree: two dimensional array // each row corresponding to a
level of DGH and column to the node in the particular level
Input : T: A table to be k-anonymised
Q: a set of n quasi-identiﬁer attributes
a set of dimension tables (one for each quasi-identiﬁer in Q) // Contains
source and destination nodes
Output : The array of integers which represents the levels of generalisations of the
quasi-identiﬁers of T required to achieve k-anonymity
1 Construct the domain generalised hierarchy using Samarati’s algorithm for the given
tables
2 node   array of n zeros
3 temp   anonymity(node) // anonymity() is a function which takes the
node in the DGH as input and outputs the anonymity of the
particular node using suppression limit m
4 if temp  k then
5 return node // T is anonymous as it is given
6 end
7 while temp < k do
8 array node   array of nodes obtained by generalising each quasi-identiﬁer at a time
9 array anonymity   empty array
10 for each level in array levels append anonymity(node) to array anonymity
11 array index   max(array anonymity) // max() is a function which takes
an integer array as input and outputs the array of indices
of all the integers with the largest value in the input
array
12 if len(array index) = 1 then
// len() is a function which takes an array as an input and
outputs the number of elements in the input array
13 node   array node[array index[0]]
14 temp   array anonymity[array index[0]]
15 else
16 index   diverse(array index) // diverse() is a function which
takes and array of integers as an input, takes into
consideration the nodes in array node with indices in
array index and outputs the index of the node which
generalises the most diverse attribute (i.e. the
attribute with the most distinct values as used in
Datafly algorithm)
17 node   array node[index] temp   array anonymity[index]
18 end
19 end
20 return node
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QI2. The CUPS dataset has 96367 records and 479 attributes among which, 5 attributes
(namely Age (4), Gender (3), Income (4), Cluster (4) and Domain (3)) were considered to
be QIs. Whilst we endeavoured for this exercise to maximize the number of attributes that
we used as quasi-identiﬁers, the data quality of the remaining attributes was poor and,
we deemed, insufﬁciently good for our purposes. However, the results presented here
are not dependent on the particular attributes chosen; very similar patterns of results are
obtained regardless of the cross classiﬁcation of QIs employed. Since the hierarchies used
in our analysis are not supplied in the machine learning repository, the authors considered
various hierarchies and chose the ones which were most appropriate based on common
sense domain knowledge.
Comparing the time complexities of the algorithms, Samarati’s algorithm has an exponen-
tial time complexity (shown in Theorem 1) and both the greedy approaches discussed have
polynomial time complexities (shown in Theorem 2). From the time complexities, it is obvi-
ous that Dataﬂy will have the minimum time of execution followed by proposed improved
greedy and Samarati. Figures 4 and 5 compare the execution times of the Dataﬂy, Samarati
and improved greedy algorithms for the two datasets. As expected, the execution time of
Samarati’s algorithm is the highest3. The execution times of both greedy approaches are
found to be almost the same with Dataﬂy being the faster of the two.
Figure 4: Anonymity vs time for the Adult dataset.
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When applying disclosure control to any data product, we need to be mindful of the im-
pact on the utility of that product. If privacy were our only concern, then utility would
tend to become zero. In the literature, damage to utility is most frequently operationalised
as information loss of which there are many different deﬁnitions. According to Domingo-
Ferrer and Torra [28], information loss can be obtained by comparing the original data to
the masked one, the closer the data is to the original, the lower is the information loss. A
2The numbers in the brackets indicate the maximum height in the hierarchy.
3The execution time of Samarati’s approach varies non-monotonically. This is because the execution time of
Samarati’s algorithm also depends on the order in which the QIS is arranged in the DGH.
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Figure 5: Anonymity vs time for the CUPS dataset.
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similar deﬁnition is given by Xu et al. in [29]: the information loss measures “how well the
generalised tuples approximate the original ones”.
A general-purpose metric that is considered here is iloss, proposed by Xiao and Tao [11].
This metric is used to ﬁnd the information loss of transforming a value to a more general
one. It assumes that all raw values are at the leaves of the taxonomic tree. The detail of this
metric is given in [30]. The formula is given below:
iloss(Vg) =
jVgj   1
jDAj
(19)
iloss(r) =
X
Vg2r
(wi  iloss(Vg)) (20)
iloss(T) =
X
r2T
iloss(r) (21)
Where:
jVgj is the number of domain values that are descendants of Vg
jDAj is the number of domain values in the attribute A of Vg
wi is a positive constant specifying the penalty weight of attribute Ai of Vg
The information loss of the k-anonymised datasets for the three algorithms is plotted in
Figures 6 and 7. We would expect Samarati’s algorithm to have the lowest information
loss as it searches for the optimal solution in the hierarchy using brute force. So, the ideal
would be to achieve the same information loss as Samarati’s algorithm but with lower time
complexity(i.e. inapolynomialtime). TheDataﬂyalgorithm, havingleasttimecomplexity,
suffers from very high information loss and the loss is unacceptable if the value of k is
large. The improved greedy algorithm has time complexity comparable to Dataﬂy and
information loss comparable to Samarati’s algorithm.
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Figure 6: Anonymity vs iloss for the Adult dataset.
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Figure 7: Anonymity vs iloss for the CUPS dataset.
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
x 10
5
Anonimity (k)
I
L
o
s
s
 
M
e
t
r
i
c
 
 
Samarati
Datafly
Improved Greedy
TRANSACTIONS ON DATA PRIVACY 6 (2013)14 K. S. Babu, N. Reddy, N. Kumar, M. Elliot, S. K. Jena
Figures 8 and 9 show the level of generalisation at which a given level of k-anonymity was
achieved for the three algorithms. The level of generalisation for the improved greedy algo-
rithm is similar to the Samarati’s algorithm for the Adult dataset although slightly inferior
for the CUPS dataset. In both cases the improved greedy algorithm performs markedly bet-
ter than Dataﬂy. The improved greedy algorithm has similar information loss to Samarati’s
algorithm so it may seem surprising that it performs slightly worse in terms of the level
of generalisation. However, as Samarati’s algorithm uses a brute force method to ﬁnd the
solution in the lowestpossible level, it optimises only with respect tothe level of generalisa-
tion metric but the information loss within a level of a full domain generalisation hierarchy
is not the same for all the nodes. The improved greedy heuristic gives more emphasis on
choosing the nodes within a level. So, the nodes chosen at a given level by our algorithm have,
on average, less information loss than those chosen by Samarati’s algorithm but when we
consider only the level of generalisation Samarati’s algorithm performs better. Overall, the
information loss is comparable.
Figure 8: Anonymity vs level of generalisation for Adult dataset.
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Figure 10 shows the execution times of various algorithms with varying the number of
QIs for k = 10. This analysis was done for the Adult dataset for 3 to 8 QIs. We can infer
that the execution time of Samarati’s approach was highest as expected. In addition, as
expected, its execution time is found to increase exponentially as the number QIs increases.
6 Conclusion
Before the release of any data product, there is a need to consider a balance between util-
ity and privacy. In this paper, we have proposed an improved greedy heuristic for k-
anonymisation that maintains a better balance between privacy and information loss than
other similar algorithms. Metrics like iloss, computing time and level of generalisation
were used to compare the new algorithm with the established Dataﬂy and Samarati’s al-
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Figure 9: Anonymity vs level of generalisation for the CUPS dataset.
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Figure 10: Quasi-identiﬁer vs time for the Adult dataset for k=10.
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gorithms. On balance, the new greedy algorithm performed better than either of the estab-
lished ones.
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